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This paper endeavours to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nature and the possible 
importance of “global excess liquidity”, a concept which has attracted considerable attention 
in recent years. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we present some conceptual 
discussion on the meaning of excess liquidity in advanced countries with developed financial 
markets. Second, we report some descriptive analysis on the degree of co-movement of 
several possible measures of excess liquidity and spill-overs between them for a relatively 
large sample of industrialised and developing countries. Third, we estimate a VAR model for 
an aggregate of the major industrialised countries and analyse the transmission of shocks to 
global excess liquidity to the global economy, including possible cross-border spill-over 
effects to a number of domestic variables in the world’s three largest economies (the US, the 
euro area and Japan).   
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E52, F42  JEL classification codes: Non-technical summary 
 
Over recent years, market participants and economic analysts (including policy-making 
institutions such as the BIS and the ECB) have repeatedly expressed concerns about the 
excessive accumulation of liquidity in the world economy, especially in relation to its 
possible implications for price and financial stability at a global level. Concerns about the 
impact on asset prices, in particular, have been repeatedly voiced. 
Measuring excess liquidity is not a straightforward matter, however, especially in modern 
financial systems in which central bank-created (i.e. “outside”), high-powered money often 
represents only a tiny fraction of monetary and credit aggregates which are normally 
considered relevant for explaining aggregate demand. Some observers thus propose to 
compare broad, i.e. “inside” monetary aggregates with nominal spending at a global level, and 
to analyse the behaviour and effects of the resulting gap, i.e. global excess liquidity. 
The contribution of this paper to this policy debate is threefold: 
•  First, we endeavour to provide some conceptual analysis of the meaning of “excess 
liquidity” in a world of developed financial markets, where any relevant definition of 
liquidity cannot be related to central bank-driven injections of high-powered money, 
but rather reflects the endogenous choice of households and firms (endogenous 
money). Moreover, we provide a brief survey of the existing literature on the cross-
border transmission of monetary shocks, both theoretical and empirical, in order to 
shed some light on the possible channels though which shocks to excess liquidity 
could be transmitted across borders.  
•  Second, we collect data on several measures of excess liquidity for a relatively large 
number of industrialised and developing countries and we analyse the co-movement 
across them by means of a dynamic factor analysis. However, more than in the co-
movement in this paper we are focused on studying the possible cross-country spill-
over of excess liquidity. Therefore, we also analyse whether the common dynamic 
factor – which we interpret as a measure of "global excess liquidity" – Granger-
causes excess liquidity and nominal spending (measured by nominal GDP) in 
individual countries.  
•  Third, we estimate a global VAR model including a measure of global liquidity, 
proxied by a broad monetary aggregate in the G5 countries (Canada, euro area, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States), in order to identify the impact of a shock 
to excess liquidity on output and prices at the level of the world economy. In a 
further step of the analysis we extend the global VAR model by including some 
domestic variables for the world’s three largest economies, the US, the euro area and 
5
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November 2006Japan. In particular, we analyse the impact of a shock to global excess liquidity on a 
number of domestic variables. In this way, we are able to isolate the impact of a 
shock to global excess liquidity that is arguably purely monetary in nature, after 
controlling for the influence of other global variables, notably output and the price 
level. 
The main conclusions of the study are the following: 
•  At a global level, we find further support to the conjecture that monetary aggregates 
may convey some useful information on variables (such as a “spectrum of yields”) 
which matter for aggregate demand and hence inflation. Thus we conclude that 
excess liquidity is a useful indicator of inflationary pressure at a global level and 
therefore merits some attention in the same way as the level of interest rates, if not 
possibly more.  
•  At the same time, the channels though which excess liquidity might be transmitted 
across borders are both theoretically ambiguous and empirically rather elusive. By 
means of a Granger causality analysis we are able to find only scattered evidence of 
cross-border transmission. However, the VAR analysis (thanks to the sharper focus of 
the structural approach) is able to find evidence of a significant spill-over of global 
liquidity to the euro area economy and to a lesser extent to Japan, which is in line 
with the existing empirical literature suggesting that foreign monetary shocks have an 
expansionary effect.   
•  It is also interesting to note that the impact of global excess liquidity on the US 
economy is found to be significantly more limited and less straightforward to 
explain. It appears that global liquidity plays a different and more limited role for the 
“leader” currency in the international monetary system. This is an issue which might 








Over recent years, market participants and economic analysts (including policy-making 
institutions such as the BIS and the ECB) have repeatedly expressed concerns about the 
excessive accumulation of liquidity in the world economy, especially in relation to its 
possible implications for price and financial stability at a global level. Concerns about the 
impact on asset prices, in particular, have been repeatedly voiced. 
Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, said for example in a recent speech 
(King, 2006) that “rapid growth of money – as central banks have kept official interest rates 
very low – has helped to push up asset prices as investors search for yield. Data from the IMF 
suggest that world broad money in 2004 and 2005 was growing at its fastest rate since the 
late 1980s." Similar concerns have surfaced in the financial press. For example, the 
Economist of 11 August 2005 reads: “ … global liquidity has expanded at its fastest pace for 
three decades. If you flood the world with money, it has to go somewhere, and some of it has 
gone into bonds, resulting in lower yields.”. 
Measuring excess liquidity is not a straightforward matter, however, especially in modern 
financial systems in which central bank-created (i.e. “outside”), high-powered money often 
represents only a tiny fraction of monetary and credit aggregates which are normally 
considered relevant for explaining aggregate demand. For that reason it is often proposed to 
compare broad, i.e. “inside” monetary aggregates with nominal spending: “While the concept 
of excess liquidity sounds intuitive, its measurement is fraught with difficulties. What exactly 
is liquidity, and how do we determine whether it is excessive or not?  I usually define excess 
liquidity as the ratio of a monetary aggregate to nominal GDP, a.k.a. the ‘Marshallian K’, 
which is equivalent to the inverse of the ‘velocity of money’.” Looking at the most recent data 
available at the time, the conclusion is that “global excess liquidity is alive and kicking, read: 
still expanding” (Morgan Stanley, 2005).  
Against the background of this debate, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we 
endeavour to provide some conceptual analysis of the meaning of “excess liquidity” in a 
world of developed financial markets, where any relevant definition of liquidity cannot be 
related to central bank-driven injections of high-powered money, but rather reflects the 
endogenous choice of households and firms ("endogenous" money).
3 Moreover, we provide a 
brief survey of the existing literature on the cross-border transmission of monetary shocks, 
                                                 
3 See for example Laidler (1999) and Pösö and Stracca (2004) for more discussion on the distinction 
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November 2006both theoretical and empirical, in order to shed some light on the possible channels through 
which shocks to excess liquidity could be transmitted across borders.  
Second, we assess empirically whether excess liquidity measures in individual countries 
exhibit significant co-movement and whether excess liquidity conditions spills over across 
borders. In an initial step, we try to gain some understanding of the extent to which excess 
liquidity and its spill-overs may be a global phenomenon by including a relatively large 
number of countries. The price that we have to pay for the broader country coverage is, 
however, that data limitations for many – especially emerging market – economies pose some 
constraints on the analysis. Therefore, we focus on various measures of excess liquidity only 
and study the co-movement across them by means of a dynamic factor analysis. Possibly 
more importantly, we use the same measures of excess liquidity to study the extent of cross-
country spill-overs caused by excess liquidity. Therefore, we also analyse whether the 
common dynamic factor – which we interpret as a measure of "global excess liquidity" – 
Granger-causes excess liquidity and nominal spending (measured by nominal GDP) in 
individual countries.  
Third, we study the relevance of excess liquidity and cross-country liquidity spill-overs in 
more depth for the smaller set of G5 countries (Canada, euro area, Japan, United Kingdom 
and United States) for which better quality data are available. Similar to Sousa and Zaghini 
(2003) we estimate a global VAR model including a measure of global liquidity in order to 
identify the impact of a shock to excess liquidity on output and prices at the level of the world 
economy. In this set-up we proxy global excess liquidity by an aggregation of broad money in 
the G5 countries unadjusted for nominal GDP, since we include prices and output separately 
in the specification. This allows us to interpret a shock to excess liquidity since the 
endogenous response of money to income and prices is already taken into account., For the 
aggregate G5 model, we find that our measure of excess liquidity has a statistically significant 
and sizeable impact on output and prices at a global level. While this result underlines the 
potential usefulness of the concept of global excess liquidity, it, however, does not allow us to 
distinguish whether what we observe at a global level is due to the simple aggregation of the 
impacts in the individual economies or, at least to some extent, also to a spill-over across 
countries. Hence, in a further step of the analysis we extend the global VAR model by 
including some domestic variables for the world’s three largest economies, the US, the euro 
area and Japan.  
Unlike Sousa and Zaghini, we follow a “marginal approach” similar to Kim (2001) and 
analyse the impact of a shock to global excess liquidity on a number of domestic variables. In 
this way, we are able to isolate the impact of a shock to global excess liquidity that is 
arguably purely monetary in nature, after controlling for the influence of other global 
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that global inflationary pressure appears to be an important, if not the most important, 
determinant of inflationary pressure at a global level (see for example Ciccarelli and Mojon 
2005). Notably, Borio and Filardo (2006) have recently argued that a global measure of the 
output gap outperforms domestic measures in affecting inflationary pressure in 15 
industrialised countries. Our paper endeavours to shed some light on the issue of whether this 
is also true for the monetary shocks, which is important since these shocks arguably drive the 
long-term developments in inflation at a global level. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the conceptual underpinnings of 
excess liquidity and of its possible cross-country transmission. In Section 3 we describe the 
data used in our analysis and we analyse the comovement across excess liquidity indicators 
for each country and carry out the Granger causality analysis. The VAR analysis is in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Is it useful to look at global excess liquidity and at cross-
country liquidity spillovers? 
 
In this section we set out to shed some light on the nature and possible importance of global 
excess liquidity at a conceptual level. We divide the discussion in two parts. In Section 2.1, 
we propose an interpretation of quantitative measures of excess liquidity as indicators of 
inflationary pressure and hence, broadly speaking, of the monetary policy stance. In Section 
2.2, we provide a brief survey of the literature on the cross-border transmission of monetary 
shocks in the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework as well as in modern open economy 
models featuring nominal rigidities. The basic question we attempt to answer is whether the 
indications coming from this literature – where a monetary shock is typically a central bank-
led change in the monetary base or, interchangeably, in the a money market interest rate – 
carry through also to a situation where “money” is measured by an endogenous, private 
sector-chosen broad monetary aggregate. 
2.1 Excess money as an indicator of inflationary pressure  
 
In a perfectly functioning, frictionless capital market, purchasing power is transferred across 
time and contingencies at no cost and asset prices and returns are sufficient statistic for all the 
market information. In such a world, measures of the money supply (and more generally 
financial quantities) contain no independent information, since a nominal risk-free interest 
rate summarises all the information which is relevant for the equilibrium in the money 
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(Svensson, 2003).  
However, there is a long tradition of economic thought, which goes back to the “founding 
fathers” of monetarism (Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, Karl Brunner, Allan Meltzer and 
so on) emphasising that, due to a number of capital market imperfections, money and non-
monetary assets may be imperfectly substitutable. As a consequence, the behaviour of 
monetary aggregates may reflect not only contemporaneous output, price and interest rate 
developments, but also a “spectrum of yields” on a number of financial and real assets. To the 
extent that this is the case, then “excess liquidity” – defined operationally as money demand 
purged from, and not explainable by, the influence of current nominal spending and of a 
short-term interest rate – may be a proxy variable for yields which matter for aggregate 
demand and inflationary pressure.
4  
In the continuation, we are going to build on the hypothesis that a measure of excess money 
may have information on inflationary pressure. It should be noted that pressures on aggregate 
demand may stem from a number of demand and supply shocks that are not necessarily 
related to shocks in the supply of money by the central bank. Nonetheless, a broad 
interpretation of a money-based measure of inflationary pressure in terms of "monetary policy 
stance" is a legitimate one, if one is ready to accept that the ultimate responsibility for 
inflationary pressure lies in the management of nominal aggregate demand and thus squarely 
with the monetary authority. This is consistent with a view of inflation and the price level in 
which the central bank can decide to accommodate, or not accommodate, inflationary 
pressures coming from a variety of economic actors and phenomena, as pioneered by Gordon 
(1975).
5 Our focus on this paper is whether monetary aggregates can capture the thrust of 
these shocks at a global level, in a world of developed financial systems in which monetary 
policy is carried out in a complex game of credibility and expectations and cannot be easily 
measured by observing a rate of growth of base money or the level of the overnight rate. Our 
second question of interest is whether global monetary shocks (seen as shocks to the 
"demand" for domestic inflation) affect macroeconomic variables in large-sized economies, 
where monetary authorities arguably pursue an independent monetary policy.   
                                                 
4  See Meltzer (1999) and Nelson (2003) for an extended exposition of this argument. 
5 See, for example, this quotation from Gordon (1975): “While no group in society explicitly 
“demands” more inflation, pressures for the government to pursue a more inflationary policy, or not to 
pursue an anti-inflationary policy, emanate from taxpayers who resist tax increases (...) groups 
attempting to obtain an increase in their share of national income and, in open economies, from price 
increases and inflows of money from abroad. These pressures constitute an implicit, if not an explicit, 
demand for inflation. (…) The mere existence of pressures on the government to inflate does not 
guarantee that inflation will occur. Variations in the monetary expansion “supplied” in response to a 
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correct (as indeed also argued by Meltzer 1999 and Nelson 2003) then the type of shocks 
which excess liquidity may proxy for is not essentially different from an injection of outside 
money in the economy normally studied in the literature, which is typically thought to result 
in a persistent rise of nominal aggregate demand and a temporary rise of real economic 
activity. This implies, in turn, that we can use the existing literature on the international 
transmission of monetary policy shocks as a guideline for the analysis of excess liqudity spill-
overs. We turn to briefly survey this literature in the next section. 
2.2 The international transmission of monetary shocks: a relevant 
framework for excess liquidity spillovers?  
 
2.2.1 What should we expect in theory? 
The Mundell-Fleming framework. An important framework for earlier thinking about 
international monetary transmission was the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model.
6 An expansionary 
monetary policy shock, which is represented by a central bank-induced increase in the supply 
of money, leads to a reduction of the domestic interest rate, which, in turn, triggers a 
depreciation of the home currency through the resulting capital outflows. As a result, global 
spending is directed towards domestic goods and domestic output increases (expenditure-
switching effect). The impact of monetary policy is of the “beggar-thy-neighbour” type, 
raising domestic output at the expense of foreign output.
7 As money is an exogenous variable, 
no direct quantity spill-overs of liquidity occur.
8 However, it remains possible that the foreign 
monetary authority reacts to the contraction of foreign output by injecting more money into 
the system. The reaction of the foreign monetary authority may thus create a positive 
correlation between domestic money and foreign money, while weakening at the same time 
the correlation between domestic monetary policy and foreign output. 
The New Open Economy Models. In the new generation of models (see e.g. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 1995, Kollmann 2001) featuring nominal rigidities and imperfect asset substitution 
                                                 
6 The discussion is limited to the case of flexible exchange rates. In the case of fixed exchange rates the 
spillover operates directly through the monetary policy reaction of the other country, which is 
completely determined by the desire to keep the exchange rate fixed. In reality, many nominally 
flexible exchange rate regimes may contain elements of a fixed rate regime, for instance, due to a “fear 
of floating”. Observed spillovers may therefore reflect at least in part an endogenous monetary policy 
response even in the case of “official floaters”.  
7 The impact on output should not be confused with the impact on real disposable income and 
consumption, since the depreciation of the exchange rate worsens the terms of trade for the home 
country. As shown by Tille (2001), if home and foreign goods are poor substitutes, a country can be 
adversely affected by its own monetary expansion because of the worsening of the terms of trade. 
8 In Annex 1 we sketch a portfolio balance model similar to Branson (1977), which can be used to 
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9 the basic MF result may be overturned and expansionary monetary policy 
increases output both at home and abroad (“prosper-thy-neighbor” effect). As in the MF 
model, the home currency depreciates as a result of the monetary expansion, which leads to a 
demand shift away from foreign goods. However, this intra-temporal effect may be 
overturned by the inter-temporal effect as initially sticky prices are expected to increase in the 
following period, thereby reducing the real rate of interest on foreign assets. As current period 
goods thus become cheaper relative to future goods, demand – both for foreign and domestic 
goods – is at the same time shifted towards the present (intertemporal switching effect). If this 
intertemporal aspect, which is completely absent in the MF framework, prevails a domestic 
monetary expansion raises foreign output.  
In addition, the expenditure-switching effect is significantly reduced if firms follow pricing to 
market policies, i.e. set prices in the local, rather than the domestic currency in order to 
maintain market share (Betts and Devereux 2001, Schmidt 2006). Also in this framework, the 
endogenous reaction of foreign monetary policy to foreign consumer prices, which are 
affected by exchange rate developments, may undo the expenditure switching effect and 
affect the correlation between the domestic policy impulse and foreign output (Borondo 
2000). The same could be said, however, of the intertemporal switching effect, whose impact 
could also be undone by the monetary authorities in the foreign country. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the effect of a domestic monetary policy shock, which is transmitted through 
exchange rate and interest rate effects, on foreign output is ambiguous, especially when the 
(endogenous) reaction of foreign monetary policy is contemplated.
10  
Direct transmission of price shocks. Another channel of transmission, which has been 
described in the literature, does not require any spill-over of aggregate demand conditions 
across countries, but affects the foreign economy directly through a cost-push shock. The 
argument is that, if foreign prices rise and if such rise is not compensated by an appreciation 
of the exchange rate, this increases firms’ marginal costs directly (through trade in 
intermediate products) as well as indirectly (through the impact of higher import prices on 
workers' purchasing power and therefore on wage demands). Changes in marginal costs are 
then transmitted to inflation (Kollmann 2001). Depending on the extent to which domestic 
inflationary pressures are accommodated or not by the central bank, a foreign expansionary 
monetary shock can raise the domestic price level more or less permanently.  
 
                                                 
9 See Lane (2001) for a survey of this literature. 
10 Even if an expansionary domestic monetary policy shock decreases foreign output, both foreign and 
domestic welfare increase nonetheless. Those effects leading to a welfare reduction turn out to be 
second-order effects, with the only first-order effect being the reduction in monopolistic distortions 
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On the empirical side, a number of studies have tried to identify the transmission of monetary 
and/or liquidity conditions across countries. Most of these studies focus on the transmission 
of monetary policy shocks in the framework of a VAR model. It is important to note that the 
existing empirical analysis typically limit the analysis to the impact of a monetary policy 
shock from the “leader” country (i.e. the US) on “follower” countries that have at least some 
features of small open economies. The empirical literature is very scarce on the transmission 
of monetary shocks among equally-sized countries. 
Using a VAR set-up to analyse data for the G7 countries, Kim (2001) finds that, in contrast to 
the basic prediction of the Mundell-Fleming model, an expansionary US monetary policy 
shock leads to an increase in activity both in the US and in other countries. US monetary 
policy, through lowering world real interest rates, stimulates aggregate demand globally. 
Although the US trade balance also improves after some time, the magnitude of this effect 
appears to be too small to validate the Mundell-Fleming predictions. In addition to the federal 
funds rate, Kim also includes various monetary aggregates individually (non-borrowed 
reserves, overall reserves, M0, M1, and M2) in the VAR and finds that the results are 
generally robust to their inclusion. Betts and Deveraux (2001) and Miniane and Rogers 
(2003) also provide evidence for a positive transmission effect of US expansionary monetary 
policy shocks on output in other countries. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) document 
significant effects of US monetary policy shocks on equity market developments in a large 
number of countries.   
Further evidence on the importance of cross-country spill-over effects comes from Canova 
(2005), who studies the transmission of US shocks to eight Latin American countries, using a 
Bayesian VAR. An important finding of this paper is that a US monetary shock (as opposed 
to other US shocks) has a strong impact on macroeconomic developments in these countries. 
However, the patterns of transmission are somewhat different from those typically found in 
developed countries. After a contractionary US monetary policy shock, interest rates are 
found to rise, which attracts capital inflows and pushes aggregate demand up, not down.  
It should be noted that there is typically no analysis of the impact of foreign monetary shocks 
on US variables in this literature. One way in which we aim at contributing to the literature is 
to take a global perspective and analyse not only the impact of US monetary shocks on other 
countries, but also the impact of global monetary shocks onto the US, i.e. the “reserve 
country”.  
The second contribution of our empirical analysis compared with the existing literature is to 
look at a quantity-based measure of the monetary policy stance, while in the literature   
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scant. Baks and Kramer (1999) document that aggregate G7 money growth appears to have 
some effect on G-7 interest rates and stock returns. Moreover, they also evaluate the extent of 
the cross-country spillover, finding that increased liquidity growth in one country is often 
consistent with an increase in G-7 real stock returns and a decline in real interest rates in other 
countries. (In particular this is true for the transmission from Japan to the US). Baks and 
Kramer look at "excess” money growth, obtained subtracting nominal GDP growth from 
nominal money growth. In line with Schinasi and Hargraves (1993), they interpret this 
measure as “potential inflation pressures in markets not captured by national income account 
measure of output and prices”.  
Sousa and Zaghini (2003) include a “global liquidity” variable in a VAR model of the euro 
area in order to analyse whether monetary aggregates in the euro area are affected by liquidity 
developments abroad. The global liquidity indicator is constructed aggregating broad money 
indicators for the US, Japan, the UK and Canada. They find that a positive shock to these 
liquidity aggregates results in an increase in euro area prices, output and in the monetary 
aggregate M3. Moreover, in the variance decomposition analysis they find that the bulk of the 
variability of euro area M3 and the price level is determined by fluctuations in global 
liquidity. Holman and Neumann (2002) analyse the transmission of monetary shocks between 
the US and Canada. Using a VAR specification including monetary aggregates in both 
countries but no interest rates, they find significant spill-overs to the other country’s real 
sector. At the same time, a monetary expansion in one country leads to a slight and 
statistically insignificant monetary contraction in the partner country.  
 
3. An analysis of cross-country liquidity spillovers  
3.1 The data  
 
In this study we gather data for 15 countries, including the euro area, United States of 
America, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, China, India, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Brazil, 
Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. For each country, we collect a measure of 
narrow and broad money stock, seasonally adjusted where possible (otherwise seasonally 
adjusted by applying the X12-ARIMA procedure) and nominal GDP (again seasonally 
adjusted with X-12 where needed). We can then compute the “excess money” indicator for 
each country as a ratio between broad or narrow money and nominal GDP; this measure is 
computed both for broad and narrow money. It should be noted that, at this stage, we are not 
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proposed measure of excess liquidity is a relatively rough one and should only be interpreted 
as a starting point in the analysis. We will propose a more elaborated and probably more 
realistic measure in the VAR analysis in the next Section. 
The data are collected at a quarterly frequency, over a sample period from 1980Q1 to 2004 
Q4 (but data for most countries, especially developing ones, are available only on a 
considerably shorter sample). Data sources differ across variables and countries; they include 
the ECB, the BIS, IMF, OECD, Eurostat and CEIC databases. For broad and narrow money, 
national definitions have been used.
11  
For a subset of countries for which more data are available, namely the G5 countries (US, 
euro area, Japan, Canada and United Kingdom) we have collected a larger database.
12 Besides 
the excess money indicators, for each of these economic areas the database includes the log of 
real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator, a short-term (3-month) nominal interbank interest rate, 
the log of the real effective exchange rate, and the log of an index of real asset prices, 
including residential and commercial property and equity prices.
13  
We also build global aggregates in a way similar to Sousa and Zaghini (2003, 2006) by 
aggregating the variables for the G5 countries. The cross-country aggregation is carried out 
by using fixed real GDP weights at PPP exchange rates of 1995 (which is at about the middle 
of our sample period), using IMF data.  
Moreover, for the world’s three largest economies (the US, the euro area and Japan) we 
construct a measure of external monetary conditions, i.e. the monetary conditions prevailing 
globally excluding domestic developments. These conditions are proxied by aggregate broad 
money in the G5 with the exclusion of one among US or the euro area or Japan each time. 
Thus, for example the relevant G4 aggregate for the euro area is the aggregate excess money 
in the G5 with the exclusion of the US component, and thus represents an indicator of 
external broad liquidity conditions relevant for the euro area (in this dimension we also follow 
the same approach as in Sousa and Zaghini, 2003). In addition, we model other aspects of the 
external environment by aggregating real GDP and the GDP deflator for the G4 countries. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 reports the four key variables we are going to analyse (real 
GDP, the GDP deflator, excess money and the nominal interest rate) for the G5. It is 
                                                 
11 Note that our data do not cover cross-border deposits. 
12 It should be noted that the G5 countries represent over half of the world economy in real GDP 
evaluated at PPP exchange rates, and close of 90% of the advanced economies. Although we do not 
have data, it is very likely that their weight on the world economy is much larger than 50% as far as 
monetary and financial aggregates are concerned, due to the higher degree of financial development in 
the advanced countries. 
13 The latter data have been kindly provided by C. Borio at the Bank for International Settlements; see 
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which, in conjunction with the very low level of interest rates, has attracted a lot of attention 
in “excess liquidity” in the world economy. At the same time, the shortfall of money in the 




[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3.2 A dynamic factor analysis  
 
As a first step in the analysis, we try to obtain a general understanding of the importance of 
excess liquidity and spill-overs thereof for a relatively broad set of countries, including both 
industrialised and emerging countries. This broad country coverage, of course, imposes some 
restrictions on the type of analysis we conduct given data constraints, especially in the case of  
some emerging market economies. Therefore we limit this preliminary analysis to a study of 
excess liquidity measures, which can be constructed for all countries in the sample. In this 
section we assess whether excess liquidity developments in individual countries contain some 
common “global’ component, which might be captured by an unobservable common dynamic 
factor. Concretely, the following parametric model is estimated:  
 
t t t













Yt represents the vector of excess liquidity measures in the different countries. Each monetary 
aggregate is assumed to be a linear function of its own lagged value, an unobservable 
common component, Zt, and a white noise error term εt. The common factor Zt, in turn, 
follows itself a first-order autoregressive process with white noise error term η, whose 
variance is standardised to unity.
14 To the extent that liquidity conditions in one country spill 
over to liquidity conditions in other countries this should, in principle, be picked up by this 
                                                                                                                                            
on the 8 euro area countries for which data are available, which cover more than 90% of the entire euro 
area. 
14 The addition of further lags did, in general, not improve the fit of the model sufficiently as to justify 
the associated loss in degrees of freedom. In that respect it is important to note that the effect of the 
common shock on Yt is more complex than suggested by the simple AR(1) structure of the common 
factor, since the common factor also enters the measurement equation through the lagged dependent 
variable term. In fact, by re-writing the model slightly, it can be seen that it represents a special case of 
a more general dynamic factor model: 
t t t AL DL I B AL I Y ε η
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common factor could also reflect common “global” shocks affecting different countries at the 
same time rather than true spillovers. The parametric specification allows to separate these 
two possibilities to some extent, as lagged spill-over effects can be captured by the A matrix, 
leaving only common shocks to be captured by the common factor.
15  
Initially, we estimate the dynamic factor model for a large set of countries.
16 In order to make 
the series stationary we employ three different methods of detrending: first order differencing, 
detrending with a linear time trend and de-trending using an HP-filter. In each case we 
consider both narrow and broad monetary aggregates.  
The results, reported in Table 1, suggest that the degree of co-movements differs significantly 
between the different methods of detrending, while the distinction between narrow and broad 
money appears to be generally less important. The highest degree of co-movement is found 
for time-detrended variables and the lowest for differenced aggregates. In the former case, the 
common factor explains on average around one third of the variance of a country’s monetary 
aggregates. As the share of variance explained by the common factor is generally highest for 
the main industrialised countries we re-estimated the model for the G7 (including the euro 
area) countries only. As a result, the average share of variance explained by the common 
factor increases in almost all cases, with particularly strong increases in the case of time de-
trended data, where the share increases to about 50% in the case of narrow money. In general, 
no clear pattern emerges regarding possible country groupings within the G7 with particularly 
strong links. A possibly argument could be made that the common factor is especially 
important in the case of the US (though not for narrow money) and Canada, suggesting that 
spillovers from the US might be especially important in driving monetary developments in the 
G7 with the effect on neighbouring Canada being particularly strong.   
 
 




                                                 
15 Unfortunately, such a separation of effects is not completely possible to the extent that some spill-
overs occur within the same period rather than with a lag, which appears likely given the quarterly 
frequency of the data. For a more detailed discussion of the above specification of the dynamic factor 
model see Monfort et al. (2003). 
16 We chose to exclude some countries from the entire sample as limited sample sizes in some cases 
would have been too costly in terms of degrees of freedom. Ultimately, the factor analysis includes the 
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While the common factor analysis has the advantage of being multi-variate in nature, 
allowing the simultaneous analysis of a large number of time series, it may fail under certain 
circumstances to provide evidence for actual spill-over effects, as opposed to common shocks 
driving the variables. Thus, in order to complement the preceding analysis we therefore 
perform Granger-causality tests for the various monetary aggregates in different countries.  
Along similar lines, Baks and Kramer (1999) also conduct Granger-causality for different 
monetary aggregates of the G7 countries and find strong evidence that US and Japanese broad 
money growth Granger-causes broad money growth abroad, with little evidence of causality 
in the case of German money.  No causality is found for narrow aggregates, however. 
Our own analysis
17 (not reported in full for brevity) suggests that there is some limited 
evidence for statistically significant causation between the excess liquidity measures in 
different countries. In general, causation is found more frequently for liquidity measures 
based on narrow money than for those based on broad aggregates. Among the various excess 
liquidity measures, it is in particular the time-detrended measures followed by the HP-filtered 
and the differenced aggregate.
18 A considerable number of cases of significant causation 
involve the major industrialised countries (about one third of the overall number). However, 
most of that causation is towards countries outside the group with only limited causation 
between the industrialised countries themselves. Liquidity conditions in the United States 
appear to be especially important, followed by the euro area, the United Kingdom and, last, 
Japan.  
Applying a gravity-type argument to the geographical distribution of liquidity spill-overs, one 
might expect that the transmission of liquidity conditions exhibits a strong regional 
component. Nonetheless, the data do not appear to support such a conclusion. For example, 
the causation from the US or Japan does not exhibit any tendency to be particularly 
pronounced in the Western Hemisphere and Asia, respectively.  
Some cases of Granger-causation can also be found in the case of the common factor 
extracted from the various measures of excess liquidity across different countries (see Table 
2). The results for the common factor calculated for the five major industrialised countries 
and that for the wider group including five additional countries (Australia, Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa, Taiwan) are very similar and we report only those for the former (see table 
below). Overall, it seems again that causation is more often found for narrow monetary 
                                                 
17  In the Granger-causality test we allow for four lags. 
18 In principle, we could have also performed the Granger-causality tests for the non-adjusted excess 
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effect of the common excess liquidity factor on the domestic money aggregate is larger and 
more significant in the case of differenced and time de-trended broad money, but in no case 
significant for narrow money. Causation is also more frequent for the major five 
industrialised countries.
19 Some evidence can be found that monetary conditions in Korea, 
Brazil and New Zealand might be affected by developments in the five major industrialised 
countries. The evidence is, however, in general not robust to the definition of the monetary 
aggregate. These results are consistent with earlier evidence (for example see Mishkin 2005) 
that the bulk of cross-border financial flows take place among advanced countries, which are 
significantly more financially integrated than emerging economies.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In addition to testing for Granger causality between measures of excess money in different 
countries we also test whether excess money in one country Granger causes nominal GDP 
growth in other countries. Again, we find some limited evidence for such causation. Also in 
this case, cross-country spill-overs are particularly frequent for excess money in the major 
five economic countries/areas, with the effect being predominantly on the GDP of countries 
outside this group. However, again no clear regional patterns can be identified. Causation 
from the common factor is most significant in the case of the major five industrialised 
countries, suggesting a possible link between aggregate liquidity conditions within the group 
on activity in the group (see Table 2). Activity outside this core group appears to be largely 
unaffected, however, with the possible exception of Korea and Taiwan.  
In order to gauge whether cross-country liquidity spill-over effects have gained in importance 
over time we also conduct the same Granger-causality tests for the more recent sub-sample 
starting in the first quarter of 1990 (see Table 3). Overall, there appears to be some evidence 
that liquidity spill-overs might have become, if anything, somewhat less prevalent for the 
major five industrialised economies. This applies both for spill-overs to liquidity conditions 
and to nominal GDP. For liquidity spill-overs to other countries no strong tendency of 
increasing or decreasing importance can be identified. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                                                                                                            
be non-stationary this would have potentially given rise to spurious causation (see, for example, He and 
Maekawa, 2001).  
19 Of course, one limitation of this analysis is that the monetary aggregates of the five major 
industrialised countries form the basis for the estimation of the common factor. However, although the 
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The above analysis provides some evidence for potential interactions between liquidity 
conditions in different countries. The common dynamic factor analysis showed that there is a 
significant degree of co-movement between the various measures of liquidity, especially for 
the major industrialised countries. Although this co-movement may reflect common shocks, it 
may also reflect spill-over effects, with the two effects being difficult to disentangle. Some 
supporting evidence for the spill-over hypothesis comes from the Granger-causality tests, 
which suggest that, in particular, excess liquidity conditions in the industrialised countries 
may spill over within the advanced countries and, to a lesser extent, to the “periphery”. The 
evidence for such spill-over effects is, however, in general not particularly strong. 
The main difficulty in analysing directly the co-movement/interaction between measures of 
liquidity conditions is that these are affected by a number of different shocks which may lead 
to very different interactions between measures across countries. Although an increase in 
liquidity in one country may by itself lead to an increase in liquidity conditions in other 
countries, the underlying shocks may affect other variables as well, which may more than 
offset this positive effect on foreign liquidity. In order to isolate the interaction between 
liquidity conditions from such interferences originating in other areas of the economy, it is 
important to broaden the analysis and move towards a more structural approach. In particular, 
one would have to model the economies involved more explicitly and identify the various 
shocks driving the entire system. As the above preliminary analysis suggests that excess 
liquidity may play a particularly important role in the case of the major industrialised 
countries, for which data constraints are less binding, we concentrate the more in-depth 
analysis of the shock structure in the next section on the smaller set of G5 countries.  
4. A VAR analysis for the US, the euro area and Japan 
4.1 A global model 
 
We start by estimating a baseline VAR model including (in a Choleski ordering) the log of 
real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator, the log of nominal broad money indicator and the 
nominal short-term interest rate for the G5, i.e. a global model. The sample period for which 
data are available for all G5 countries is 1981:Q4 to 2004:Q4. A lag order of 3 is chosen, the 
minimal order which ensures no serial correlation of the residuals. A constant and a linear 
trend (since the model is specified in log-levels) are added to this VAR model and all 
subsequent ones estimated in this paper. 
                                                                                                                                            
countries, this does not imply any causal relationship between the common factor and individual 
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specification analysis in order to check the properties of the model. The multivariate LM AR 
test can detect no significant serial correlation up to 4 quarterly lags, and the multivariate 
Jarque-Bera test suggests that residuals are approximately Normal. We also consider a 
different, non-recursive identification scheme similar to that proposed by Kim (2001), in 
which the two alternative measures of the monetary policy stance (excess money and the 
nominal interest rate) are allowed to interact contemporaneously, but where the nominal 
interest rate does not react contemporaneously to real GDP and the GDP deflator.
20 The 
results of this alternative identification scheme were very similar to the baseline analysis, so 
we do not report them here. 
 
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to the two proposed measures of monetary policy 
stance for the G5 aggregates. To ensure comparability, the impulse responses show the effect 
of a fall in the nominal interest rate, i.e. in both cases we are analysing the impact of an 
expansionary monetary policy shock. A striking result visible in Figure 2 is that a shock to 
excess money has all the features expected of an expansionary monetary policy shock: it 
increases output temporarily, and the price level permanently (or at least very persistently). A 
second important result is that when monetary policy is measured with the nominal interest 
rate we likewise have an expansion in output, but also find a price puzzle, at least in the short 
term (after several quarters, however, the response of the price level is well behaved). It 
should be noted that this is not solved by adding an index of commodity prices to the VAR, 
and is a result which is robust to a large number of alternative specifications of the model. 
Our conclusion is that excess money appears to be a convincing empirical measure of the 
monetary policy stance at a global level, and that is has independent information value over 
and above the nominal short-term interest rate. In obtaining this result, as noted previously, 
we are consistent with a number of recent contributions in the literature (including, also at a 
global level, Sousa and Zaghini 2006).  
 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
We also re-estimate the G5 model, in the same specification, using the G4 aggregates 
excluding each time the US and the euro area in turn. The impulse responses are practically 
the same as in the G5 model. 
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Choleski ordering after output, the price level, excess money and the nominal interest rate 
(putting the asset price before the interest rate does not change the results). The impulse 
responses of this model are reported in Figure 3. It is interesting that the real asset price rises, 
though only temporarily, following a decline in the nominal interest rate (which is in line with 
asset pricing theory) but also after a shock to excess liquidity. In the latter case, however, the 
effect is tiny and not statistically significant, which is a quite interesting result with a view to 
the discussion about excess liquidity and asset prices mentioned in the Introduction to this 
paper 
Based on the results obtained and motivated by the need to avoid duplications and save on 
degrees of freedom, we also re-estimate the global VAR models (as well as the extended 
VAR models in the ensuing section) including only excess money as a measure of global 
monetary policy stance. For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 reports the impulse responses of 
G5 output and the price level to a one standard deviation shock in the excess money variable, 
which again is remarkably consistent with the expected impact of an expansionary monetary 
policy shock (and in line with the G5 model also including the nominal interest rate). The 
impact on the real asset price, if included in the model, is also in line with what is reported in 
Figure 3. 
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here] 
 
4.2 Impact on domestic variables in the US, the euro area and 
Japan 
 
We now move a step forward and endeavour to analyse the impact of a global expansionary 
monetary policy shock (measured by a shock to global broad money not explained by global 
output and price fluctuations) onto domestic variables in the world’s three largest economies, 
the US, the euro area and Japan. For each of the three economies, we estimate the 
corresponding G4 model (including real GDP, the GDP deflator and broad money) 
augmented by five domestic variables for each economy, i.e. the log of real GDP, the log of 
the GDP deflator, broad money, the nominal short-term interest rate, and the real effective 
exchange rate. Thus, an eight-variable VAR model is estimated. The global (G4) variables are 
put first in the Choleski ordering since they are considered to be “more exogenous” with 
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BIC information criterion) and includes again a constant and a linear trend.
21  
It should be noted that we do not “freeze” the parameters of the G4 models to be the same for 
the G4 variables in these extended VAR models, and thus we do not impose block exogeneity 
of the G4 variables vis-à-vis the domestic ones. Our reasoning is that since the US, the euro 
area and Japan are very large economies, one would like to allow for domestic developments 
to influence global variables, and in fact block exogeneity tests are rejected for all of them. 
This approach has the disadvantage that the inclusion of an additional variable in the VAR 
might hamper the identification of the global monetary shock, which could be a serious 
problem given the focus of our analysis. In practice, however, we find that the identification 
of the global monetary shock is maintained, at least in its qualitative features (i.e. implying a 
temporary upward impact on global output and a more persistent upward impact on the price 
level).  
The differences between our analysis and Sousa and Zaghini (2003) should also be stressed. 
In that paper, a measure of global money is included in a VAR otherwise comprising only 
domestic variables. This complicates the interpretation of their findings about the impact of a 
shock to this variable, since money can respond to a number of different shocks, and in 
particular to global output and price developments. In this analysis we have a different focus, 
since we are analysing the impact of an excess money shock on domestic variables. The 
different focus of the analysis will be reflected in a significant different outcome of the 
variance decomposition analysis, as will be shown below. 
The impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to global excess liquidity are 
reported in Figure 5 (for the US), Figure 6 (for the euro area) and Figure 7 (for Japan). We 
first report the impulse responses of the global (G4) output and the price level to a shock to 
global excess liquidity. This serves the important purpose of controlling that the extended 
specification of the VAR models maintains the identification of the shock as an expansionary 
monetary shock, finding broad confirmation in all cases.  
Moving to the impact on domestic variables, which is the main objective of the analysis, we 
find that the impact of the shock on output is positive and significant in the euro area and 
Japan, while it is negatively signed in the US. The most interesting difference is arguably the 
impact on broad money, which is positive and significant in the euro area but initially 
statistically insignificant and then negatively signed in the US. In other words, the US appears 
either to be relatively insulated from the global liquidity shock or to actively counter it, while 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that in each equation a total of 18 free parameters are estimated, since the VAR 
models include two autoregressive lags plus a constant and a linear trend. As we have almost 100 
quarterly observations in our data, this is considered to be enough to ensure sufficient degrees of 
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cannot be explained by the behaviour of monetary policy as captured by a nominal short-term 
interest rate, since the interest goes up, now down, in the euro area and Japan (albeit with 
some delay), thus offsetting the expansionary shock to some extent, while it does not move (at 
least in a statistically significant manner) in the US. If one is instead ready to accept that the 
behaviour of broad money can be a better indicator of the stance of monetary policy, as 
argued in the previous section, then the impulse responses seem to fit with the story that the 
US monetary authority insulates the US economy from the global monetary shock, while the 
monetary authorities in Japan and euro area allow it to be transmitted to domestic monetary 
conditions (and hence output and prices). 
Overall, the impact on the euro area economy is relatively easy to interpret and presents a 
textbook combination of Mundell-Fleming and New Open Economy effects. The Mundell-
Fleming channel is visible in the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. This effect, 
however, is dominated by an inter-temporal substitution effect which is clearly visible in the 
rise of excess liquidity (proxy for the “spectrum of yields”). This leads to an expansion of 
economic activity, which can be seen in the rise of real GDP. Despite the appreciation of the 
exchange rate, the price level rises, in line with the rise in demand and also possibly reflecting 
a direct spill-over from global price developments, e.g. through import prices. It is interesting 
to note that, when estimated the same model on a small open economy like Canada (reported 
in Figure 8), we get very similar results as in the euro area, with the exception that in this 
case the nominal interest rate falls after the shock, rather than rising. 
The results for Japan are quite similar to the euro area, but with a lesser degree of clarity in 
particular as regards the reaction of the price level, which displays a significant price decline 
several quarters after the shock, before rising again thereafter. This could be explained in part 
by the consideration that Japan is a considerably closer economy compared with the euro 
area, which is significantly more open. Moreover, the peculiar development of the price level 
(and of the nominal interest rate) in Japan from the early 1990s suggests that there could be 
non-linearities in the model (as it is, in fact, signalled by the multivariate Jarque-Bera tests for 
Normality of the residuals), possibly related to the policy of quantitative easing. These non-
linearities are obviously not captured in the linear model, and which therefore suggest some 
caution in over-interpreting its results. 
By contrast, it is more difficult to interpret the US findings. There, we observe a lack of 
reaction of excess liquidity, which may reflect a weaker inter-temporal substitution effect 
stemming from non-US developments or the presence of an active policy of countering 
external shocks (in line with the idea of an economic and financial dominance of the US in 
the world economy). Hence, real GDP does not rise. The only noticeable impact we observe 
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developments abroad (a cost-push type of channel). Overall, the US appears to be much more 
“insulated” from the global liquidity shock than the euro area, as will be also visible later in 
the variance decomposition analysis. 
The main findings for the three economies are qualitatively robust to some changes in the 
specification of the VAR models which we have attempted, such as in the ordering of the 
variables. Moreover, we tried to include the domestic real asset price index in place of the real 
effective exchange rate (see Figure 9). Also in this case, the results for the euro area and 
Japan are easier to interpret, since we find a statistically significant rise in the asset price 
(consistent with the overall expansionary impact of the global liquidity shock). In the US, by 
contrast, we observe a slight (but statistically insignificant) fall in asset prices, consistent with 
a lack of a positive reaction of excess liquidity and of economic activity identified in the 
baseline specification. The other main results of the analysis are unaffected by this 
modification. 
Motivated by the exceptional recent interest in the US balance of payments deficit and its 
contribution to the build up of “global imbalances”, we also estimate a variant of the baseline 
model including the current account of the balance of payments in place of the real effective 
exchange rate. It is interesting to note that the global monetary shock does not appear to have 
an impact on the current account in the euro area and Japan, but has a statistically significant 
and positive impact in the US. Hence, we find that a global expansionary monetary shock 
contributes to reduce the US external imbalance, rather than exacerbate it, which is prima 
facie a rather puzzling result. While a full analysis of this result goes well beyond the limited 
ambitions of the present paper, it is nevertheless interesting to note that also in this dimension 
the US appears to be different from the euro area and Japan, as far as the adjustment to an 
expansionary global monetary shock is concerned.
22 
Overall, our conclusion is that while the impact on euro area and (though to a lesser extent) 
Japanese variables seems quite in line with previous results in the literature, the reaction of 
the US economy is substantially different. As argued by Schmidt (2006), one explanation for 
this divergence could be related to an asymmetry in the price-setting mechanisms of non-US 
firms, which tend to price in US dollars (the dominant currency) in the US market (pricing to 
market), while US firms  tend to price in US dollars both at home and abroad. However, it is 
not immediately obvious how this explanation could apply since we are not able to find the 
expected positive impact of the monetary expansion abroad on the US real effective exchange 
rate in the first place. The conclusion of the analysis seems to be that global liquidity shocks 
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How important are global variables, global liquidity included, in explaining real and monetary 
developments in the world’s three largest economies? An answer to this question can be 
provided by means of the variance decomposition analysis, reported in Tables 4-6 up to 30 
quarters, based on the same Choleski ordering as in the previous section. In particular, we 
report the contributions of the global (i.e. G4) variables on the variability of real GDP, the 
GDP deflator, broad money and the asset price index (the latter for the alternative 
specification of the baseline models discussed earlier) in the three economies. For the US, we 
also report the variance decomposition analysis for the current account of the balance of 
payments. 
Overall, the variance decomposition analysis uncovers five interesting results. First, the 
impact of global shocks on domestic variables is smallest in the US, medium in Japan, and 
largest in the euro area, in line with the relative degrees of openness of these economies. 
Second, especially for the euro area but also for the US and Japan, the variability of the price 
level is very significantly influenced by global factors (which explain 73 per cent of the 
variability in the euro area). Third, shocks to global broad money appear to have a sizeable 
independent impact on the variability of domestic broad money, which is largest in the euro 
area (though considerably smaller than estimated in Sousa and Zaghini 2003) and smallest in 
the US. Fourth, there is also a (quite surprising) impact of global shocks on asset price 
variability, which ranges between 11 and 17 per cent across the three economies. Last, global 
output shocks appear to matter to an important degree in the euro area and Japan (quite in line 
with the recent results of Borio and Filando 2006) but much less so in the US.
23 Moreover, 
shocks to global output as identified in the model matter more or less in the same way as 
broad money shocks in explaining the variability of domestic output, suggesting that there is 
significant cyclical information in the behaviour of monetary aggregates at a global level. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
 
We conduct two robustness checks of the analysis described in the previous section. The first 
consists of computing the excess money variable based on narrow money, rather than broad 
money. The two measures are quite collinear at the global level. Unsurprisingly, when 
repeating the whole analysis based on narrow money, we come to very similar results from a 
                                                                                                                                            
22 We also tried to include different trend measures in the VAR, hoping to better capture a secular trend 
in the US current account position, but this did not change the results substantially. 
23 Note that, due to the presence of a linear trend in the VAR models, the output equation in each model 
could be construed as being a model of de-trended output and hence of the output gap, similar to Borio 
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apparently lower information content of global narrow money compared with global broad 
money might be related to the statistical problems experienced by the US M1 aggregate, 
related to the introduction of sweep programs in the mid-1990s.
24 
A second robustness check  concerns the method of aggregation. In particular, we check 
whether the results are robust with respect to the aggregation of the global liquidity measure. 
In addition to using fixed real GDP weights at PPP exchange rates we also use directly PPP 
exchange rates to transform national monetary aggregates into a common currency. As 
liquidity in one country can, in fact, be converted into another country’s currency and thus 
liquidity via the foreign exchange market, a case could also be made for using an aggregation 
based on actual market exchange rates. Although market exchange rates are considerably 
more volatile than PPP exchange rates, thereby affecting the overall aggregate, the results are 
again qualitatively in line with the PPP-based aggregation methods. Overall, the main results 
of the paper are found to be robust to the choice of aggregation method. 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tried to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conceptual and 
empirical properties of a quantity-based measure of global excess liquidity. Moreover, we 
have surveyed the theoretical channels through which we could expect excess liquidity to spill 
over across borders, and provide some empirical evidence to bear on this question. 
All in all, our analysis is able to reach two main conclusions. First, we find further support to 
the conjecture that monetary aggregates may convey some useful information on variables 
(such as a “spectrum of yields”) which matter for aggregate demand and hence inflation. Thus 
we conclude that excess liquidity is a useful indicator of inflationary pressure at a global level 
and therefore merits some attention in the same way as the level of interest rates, if not 
possibly more.  
Second, the channels though which excess liquidity might be transmitted across borders are 
both theoretically ambiguous and empirically rather elusive. By means of a Granger causality 
analysis we are able to find only scattered evidence of cross-border transmission. However, 
the VAR analysis (thanks to the sharper focus of the structural approach) is able to find 
evidence of a significant spill-over of global liquidity on the euro area economy and (albeit to 
a somewhat more limited extent) in Japan, which is in line with the existing empirical 
literature which mainly suggests that foreign monetary shocks have an expansionary effect.  
From this perspective, we find that the euro area economy appears to behave very much like a 
small open economy, although of course the situation may have changed with the introduction 
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November 2006of the euro and the establishment of a common monetary policy. It is also interesting to note 
that the impact of global excess liquidity on the US economy is found to be significantly more 
limited, has a different direction compared with the euro area and Japan and is generally 
much less straightforward to explain on the basis of the existing analytical frameworks 
(Mundell-Fleming or New Open Economy Macro). It appears that global liquidity plays a 
different and more limited role for the “leader” currency in the international monetary system. 
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November 2006ANNEX 1 – An illustrative portfolio model of international liquidity spillovers 
 
The basic set-up of the model is as follows: 
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The model consists of four asset markets: domestic money, M, domestic bonds, B, foreign 
bonds, B
*, and one additional asset, K, which might be thought of as physical capital (see, for 
example, Tobin (1969). The local-currency supply of all assets is fixed and demand is 
proportional to overall wealth. The portfolio share of each asset depend positively on the 
assets own rate of return and income and negatively on the return on other assets. The last 
equation represents the budget constraint that overall wealth equals to the sum of the various 
asset holdings. The main changes relative to the standard portfolio balance model is that 
money holdings are endogenised, thereby allowing for the possibility of endogenous changes 
in money holdings. In addition, changes in the holdings of the physical assets are associated 
with portfolio adjustment costs, due to, for example, the higher information-intensity of such 
assets.  
Regarding the endogeneity of money, it is assumed that the central bank sets the domestic 
interest rate rather than the supply of money and that private agents can adjust there holdings 
of money by switching between money and domestic bonds via the central bank. Agents can 
obtain money by transforming domestic bonds one-for-one into currency holdings. This 
mechanism can be thought of in a number of ways. It can, for example, be viewed as open 
market operations with the initiative lying with private individuals. Alternatively, one can 
think of it as the central bank standing ready to provide money against eligible collateral, e.g. 
domestic bonds, at a policy-determined exogenous interest rate. 
The introduction of adjustment costs introduces a distinction between short-run and long-run 
equilibrium. In the short run, agents are assumed to optimise their portfolios only over a 
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November 2006sufficient information has been accumulated, do agents adjust their entire asset holdings of 
financial and real assets.
25 
Consider for the purpose of illustration, the case of an expansionary monetary policy in the 
foreign country, captured by a reduction in foreign interest rates. Although not explicitly 
modelled, this is likely to result in an increase in foreign money holdings, as foreign agents 
shift out of foreign bonds and into foreign money due to the reduced opportunity costs of 
monetary balances.
26 The reduction in foreign interest rates likewise increases the relative 
attractiveness of domestic money and bonds for domestic agents – and in the long-run also 
that of real assets. In the short-run, the change in domestic money holdings as a result of 
foreign monetary easing is ambiguous. Money holdings increase in the short run, if the 
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the foreign interest rate is, in absolute 
terms, larger than the elasticity of the demand for domestic bonds. A similar ambiguity of the 
response of money holdings exists for the long-run equilibrium, with the corresponding 
necessary condition for an increase in addition depending on the elasticity of real asset 
demand. Under certain conditions, the short-run response of money exceeds that in the long 
run.
27 In particular, short-run money balances may be larger than what agents are willing to 
hold eventually once investment into information-intensive real assets is also considered. In 
that case, money balances will be reduced over time as investment demand for real assets 
increases. Equilibrium is reached once the return on real assets is sufficiently reduced to 
restore portfolio balance. In reality, this adjustment is likely to involve also an increase in the 
prices of the various real assets, which may also include durable consumer goods, and may 
thus result in an increase in inflation rates, and possibly also activity. 
                                                 
25 This timing effect introduced by adjustment costs could, for example, be rationalised by a non-linear 
costs function. In particular, if adjustment costs rise disproportionately with the size of the adjustment, 
as in the case for a quadratic cost function, the desired adjustment is optimally spread smoothly over 
time, with the short-run and long-run equilibria being the starting and end points of this process. 
Alternatively, information could be thought of as following a diffusion process, which in the case of 
sunk adjustment costs, provides an incentives for a wait-and-see approach to portfolio adjustment.  
26 For the sake of clarity of argument, we abstract from the possibility that also in the case of foreign 
money holdings short-run and long-run equilibrium are likely to differ. 
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Figure 1: G5 variables, 1981-2004  
 
(Aggregate of US, euro area, Japan, UK and Canada, using real GDP weights at PPP 
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November 2006Table 1: Share of variance explained by the common factor – G7 plus euro area 
eura area US Japan UK Canada Average
Differenced narrow money 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.16
Differenced broad money 0.05 0.51 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.19
Time trend narrow money 0.40 0.20 0.71 na 0.74 0.51
Time trend broad money 0.46 0.61 0.65 0.02 na 0.44
HP-filtered narrow money 0.09 0.95 0.05 0.01 0.26 0.27
HP-filtered broad money 0.19 0.48 0.00 0.13 0.94 0.35  
Note: The different de-trending methods are applied to broad and narrow excess liquidity 
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Table 2:   Granger causality test of excess liquidity common factor on individual country's excess liquidity
                 and nominal GDP - Full sample results
H0 = The common factor in the excess liquidity measure does not cause corresponding money aggregate/nominal GDP in country X
full sample
euro area 0.82 3.48 ** 0.70 0.48 0.99 3.98 ***
US 13.42 *** 0.66 1.34 123.50 *** 2.65 ** 5.19 ***
Japan 1.09 4.34 *** 0.50 1.54 3.21 ** 4.44 ***
UK 1.34 11.85 *** 0.73 0.50 0.41 4.52 ***
Canada 5.97 *** 3.72 *** 65.12 *** 3.88 *** 5.48 *** 3.42 **
China 2.35 * 0.74 0.37 0.77 1.91 0.76
India 0.82 1.78 2.85 * 2.01 0.85 0.98
Korea 0.97 3.43 ** 0.97 2.96 ** 1.98 1.08
Thailand 0.80 1.04 1.88 1.31 0.80 0.66
Taiwan 0.46 1.39 1.75 1.56 0.42 0.76
Brazil 0.60 0.14 0.37 1.23 2.11 * 4.83 ***
Mexico 0.73 0.43 0.78 1.65 0.80 0.06
Australia 0.71 1.80 1.71 1.60 0.55 1.89
New Zealand 0.75 1.20 2.55 ** 2.30 * 0.16 1.76
South Africa 0.57 1.55 0.15 1.25 1.84 0.42
euro area 0.51 4.81 *** 0.77 0.87 0.49 0.83
US 1.45 1.17 0.72 2.92 ** 1.35 3.44 **
Japan 0.96 4.36 *** 0.63 1.78 2.55 ** 1.82
UK 1.60 4.02 *** 0.52 1.39 1.49 0.17
Canada 2.22 * 1.99 0.83 2.56 ** 4.16 *** 1.17
C h i n a 0 . 3 41 . 1 30 . 3 41 . 1 50 . 8 30 . 4 9
I n d i a 1 . 2 91 . 1 60 . 3 60 . 7 01 . 7 92 . 2 0
Korea 0.89 2.54 ** 0.79 0.27 0.70 2.11 *
Thailand 0.14 0.89 0.70 2.47 * 0.28 0.18
Taiwan 0.14 3.61 *** 2.14 * 1.17 0.65 2.54 **
Brazil 0.12 0.56 1.27 1.94 0.33 0.32
Mexico 1.25 1.41 2.52 ** 1.66 0.72 1.02
Australia 1.77 2.00 0.99 1.40 0.28 1.35
New Zealand 0.39 0.95 0.34 3.32 ** 0.32 0.40
South Africa 0.72 2.62 ** 0.02 1.08 1.24 1.61
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
         The sample period starts in 1980Q1 in the case of Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, Korea, South Africa, United Kingdom and  
         and United States, 1995Q4 for China, 1997Q2 for India, 1982Q2 for Mexico, 1988Q2 for New Zealand, 1994Q1 for Thailand, 
         1984Q1 for Taiwan and 1992Q1 for Brazil.
broad narrow broad narrow 
broad narrow 
broad narrow 
broad narrow broad narrow 
Money aggregates
Nominal GDP
Differenced HP-filtered Time trend
Differenced HP-filtered Time trend
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Figure 2 – Impulse responses to expansionary monetary shocks: G5 model 
 
(Responses of the log of real GDP, Y, and the log of the GDP deflator, P, to a shock 
to the log of broad money, M, and to the nominal interest rate, I, the latter with a 
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Figure 3 – Impulse responses to expansionary monetary shocks: G5 model, 
including the real asset price 
 
(Responses of the log of real GDP, Y, and the log of the GDP deflator, P, and the real 
asset price Q to a shock to the log of broad money, M, and to the nominal interest 
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Figure 4 – Impulse responses to excess money, trivariate VAR model (excluding 
the nominal interest rate) 
 
(Responses of the log of real GDP, Y, and the log of the GDP deflator, P, to a shock 
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Figure 5 – Impact of a shock to G4 excess liquidity (G5 excluding the US) on US 
domestic variables 
 
(Responses of the log of G4 real GDP, YF, the log of the G4 GDP deflator, PF, the 
log of domestic real GDP, YH, the log of the domestic GDP deflator, PH, the log of 
domestic broad money, MH, the domestic nominal 3-month interest rate, IH, and the 
log of the domestic real effective exchange rate, EH, to a shock to the log of G4 
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Figure 6 – Impact of a shock to G4 excess liquidity (G5 excluding the euro area) 
on euro area domestic variables 
 
(Responses of the log of G4 real GDP, YF, the log of the G4 GDP deflator, PF, the 
log of domestic real GDP, YH, the log of the domestic GDP deflator, PH, the log of 
domestic broad money, MH, the domestic nominal 3-month interest rate, IH, and the 
log of the domestic real effective exchange rate, EH, to a shock to the log of G4 
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November 2006Figure 7 – Impact of a shock to G4 excess liquidity (G5 excluding Japan) on 
Japanese domestic variables 
 
(Responses of the log of G4 real GDP, YF, the log of the G4 GDP deflator, PF, the 
log of domestic real GDP, YH, the log of the domestic GDP deflator, PH, the log of 
domestic broad money, MH, the domestic nominal 3-month interest rate, IH, and the 
log of the domestic real effective exchange rate, EH, to a shock to the log of G4 
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November 2006Figure 8 – Impact of a shock to G4 excess liquidity (G5 excluding Canada) on 
Canadian domestic variables 
 
(Responses of the log of G4 real GDP, YF, the log of the G4 GDP deflator, PF, the 
log of domestic real GDP, YH, the log of the domestic GDP deflator, PH, the log of 
domestic broad money, MH, the domestic nominal 3-month interest rate, IH, and the 
log of the domestic real effective exchange rate, EH, to a shock to the log of G4 
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November 2006Figure 9 – Response of the real asset price index to a unit standard deviation 
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